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LANDMARK PRESERVATION: THE PROBLEM OF
THE SINGLE LANDMARK-LUTHERAN CHURCH
IN AMERICA v. CITY OF NEW YORK
In July, 1974 the New York Court of Appeals decided the case of
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York,' its first decision
concerning the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law.2 The court
held the landmark designation of the J.P. Morgan House an unconstitu-
tional taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution and sections 6 and 7 of article I of the New York
Constitution.3 Thus ended a lengthy confrontation which was initiated
in 1965, shortly after the enactment of the Landmarks Preservation
Law.
The plaintiff-Church had owned and occupied the J. P. Morgan
House, located in Manhattan, as its national headquarters since 1944.
In November of 1965, the New York City Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission designated the Morgan House a landmark and the land on
which it is situated a landmark site, independent of any other landmark
designation and not as a part of any historic district.4 A modern five-
story office building completed by the Church in 1958 and joined to the
House at basement level, was also designated by the commission as a
part of the landmark site. The commission's designation was based on
the property's importance:
it was a notable New York City residence during the first half of the
20th century, . . . [it] is significant as an early example of Anglo-
Italianate architecture, . . . it is one of the few free standing Brown-
stones remaining in the City, . . . it displays an impressive amount of
fine architectural detail and that with its conservative appearance, it
is a handsome building of great dignity.'
1. 35 N.Y. 2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
2. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-207-21.0 (1965) passed
pursuant to N.Y. GENERAL CITY LAW § 20 Subd. 25-a (McKinney 1956).
3. The fifth amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides in part that "private prop-
erty [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 6 (1938) provides in part that "[nio person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Art. I § 7(a) provides that "[pirivate property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." Since there was an independent state
ground for determining the Law unconstitutional as applied, the case was not appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.
4. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 4, Lutheran Church in America v. City of New
York, 35 N.Y.2d 21, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
5. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 10, Lutheran Church in America v. City of New
York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
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As a result of the designation, plaintiff could neither alter nor destroy
the structure without the commission's approval.'
Before the enactment of the Law, plaintiff had received bids for con-
struction of a nineteen-story building requiring the demolition of the
Morgan House. Plaintiff's goals were to expand its office facilities and
to provide space for other Lutheran organizations.! The commission's
designation of the house as a landmark precluded the proposed demoli-
tion and construction. The Church filed a constitutional declaratory
judgment action seeking relief from the commission's designation. Inter
alia, the Church contended that the restrictions of the Law applied to
the site deprived it of a valuable incident of property ownership-the
right to demolish an existing structure.8 While the lower court did not
consider the constitutional issues,' the New York Court of Appeals
based its decision on precisely those issues.10
Based on the facts presented to the reviewing court, the decision can
be narrowly construed. The court held that the application of the Law's
provisions concerning sites owned by a charitable organization" where
the landmark property was clearly inadequate for such organization's
legitimate needs," constitutes the termination of the owner's free use of
6. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0-a (1) (1965), provides
that a landmark cannot be altered or demolished unless the commission has previously
issued a certificate of no exterior effect (§ 207-5.0), a certificate of appropriateness (§ 207-
6.0-8.0) or a notice to proceed authorizing such work (§§ 207-8.0-g. (2)(b) and i (4)(b)).
7. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 4, at 8.
8. Id. at 9. The plaintiff's arguments in the brief were the following: 1) that the lower
courts correctly found the designation of the Church House as a landmark to have been
without substantial evidence; 2) that the Landmark Law is unconstitutional on its face
because it authorizes an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation, it
denies certain owners equal protection of the laws, it constitutes an unlawful delegation
of legislative authority and it denies procedural due process of law; and 3) that the
Landmark Law is unconstitutional as applied to the Church House.
9. Prior to its final determination, the case had been appealed twice on procedural
grounds. 27 App.Div.2d 237, 278 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967); 42 App.Div.2d 547, 345 N.Y.S.2d 24
(1973).
10. "Since the plantiff's proof of economic hardship is substantially unchallenged,
[there are] only questions of [constitutional] law and we should decide them." 35
N.Y.2d at 123, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
11. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 (1965), provides for
different standards for granting or denying a certificate of appropriateness for taxable or
tax-exempt properties. For a full discussion of the difference see Comment, Legal Meth-
ods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 611, 631-38 (1970), and notes 12, 48, 50,
70, infra.
12. The New York Court of Appeals adopted in this case the test for constitutionality
devised in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App.Div.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314
(1968): whether the maintenance of the landmark either physically or financially prevents
or seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose. See note 70, infra.
1975]
DEPAUL LA W REVIEW
the premises and is an unconstitutional taking.'3 In spite of the limited
factual context of the decision, the case has a far-reaching impact on
the field of historic preservation law. The instant case is the initial state
supreme court test of the validity of applying historic preservation regu-
lations to a single site, not part of a historic district,'4 and demonstrates
the potential constitutional infirmities of such an approach.'5 Addition-
ally, it is a case of first impression in the New York Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the Landmarks Law itself. The tone of the
opinion reflects the court's positive disposition toward single building
landmark preservation and historic preservation in general under differ-
ent factual situations.
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The beginnings of historic preservation law in the United States date
to the nineteenth century declaration by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railroad Co."6 that the
acquisition of historic property was a public purpose under eminent
domain. In Berman v. Parker7 the Supreme Court further expanded the
public purpose concept by the often cited dictum favoring condemna-
tion for solely aesthetic purposes: "It is within the power of the legisla-
ture to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean,well balanced as well as carefully
patrolled." 8
Under the police power," historic preservation law has evolved as a
13. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
14. For other landmark preservation ordinances similar to New York City's, see, e.g.,
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 21, §§ 21-62 to 21-64.2 (1968); PHILADELPHIA, PENN.,
CODE § 14-2008 (1956); and Los ANGELES, CAL., ORDINANCE 121,971, April 30, 1962.
15. Previous cases upholding the validity of the New York City Landmarks Law pointed
optimistically toward an upholding of the regulation of the single building landmark. See
Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848
(Sup. Ct. 1966) which held that the city law permitting designation was not confiscatory
as to owner who was free to do as he pleased with interior of building, was guaranteed a
reasonable return on investment and, if no plan could be devised to materialize that
guarantee, could make such changes as he wished; Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v.
Platt, 29 App.Div.2d 376, N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968), see note 70, infra. See also, Note, Police
Power May Subject Single Building to Special Regulations of a Landmark, 18 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 676, 679 (1967).
16. 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (involving the condemnation of land for the Gettysburg Na-
tional Military Reservation). Accord, Flaccomio v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
194 Md. 275, 71 A. 2d 12 (1950).
17. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
18. Id. at 33.
19. The test for upholding a zoning regulation under the police power is two-fold: the
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part of the expanding definition of general welfare to include the preser-
vation of cultural and aesthetic benefits. 0 By the time the first historic
district was established in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1924, a suffi-
cient legal framework had been established in general zoning litigation"
and in zoning for aesthetics" to facilitate the acceptance of historic
preservation regulation. 3 Since that time, numerous municipalities
have passed historic preservation ordinances and the courts have, with
few exceptions, upheld their validity.24
In spite of the apparently optimistic picture regarding the validity of
historic preservation ordinances, a distinction must be made between
the regulation of historic districts and the regulation of the individual
landmark. 5 Historic districts have been upheld because they preserve
regulation must have a public purpose and the "means" used to accomplish that public
purpose must be reasonable. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preserva-
tion of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 711 (1963).
20. See Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963); Dukeminier,
Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955);
Henley, Beautiful as Well as Sanitary-Architectural Controls by Municipalities in
Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 36 (1970); Comment, The Place of Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 DEPAUL
L. REV. 104 (1964).
21. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW §§ 28-32
(1971) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN]. By 1919, the United States Supreme Court had
upheld the police power to set height limits and to eliminate near nuisances from
particular areas, HAGMAN § 29. The 1916 New York City Zoning Ordinance, the first
modem zoning ordinance, was upheld in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229
N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920). Until the 1920's, however, most state courts frequently held
zoning ordinances invalid when non-nuisance uses were prohibited. The United States
Supreme Court finally settled these conflicting state decisions by upholding the constitu-
tional validity of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
22. This is true primarily in the area of sign regulation. See HAGMAN, supra note 21, §
77.
23. See J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (1965, Supp. 1972); Loflin, Zoning
and Historic Districts in New York City, 36 LAW & COMTEMP. PROB. 363 (1971); and Note,
The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of Historic Property, supra note
19.
24. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974); City of Annapolis
v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974); Bohannan v. City of San
Diego, 30 Cal.App.3d 416, 106 Cal.Rptr. 333 (1973); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Property Owners & Assoc. v. City of New Orleans,
246 La. 788, 167 So.2d 367 (1964); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773,
128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953); City
of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v.
Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So.2d 559 (1941). Contra, Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of
Olympia Fields, 104 Ill.App.2d 218, 244 N.E.2d 369 (1968) and Commonwealth v. Na-
tional Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 231, 302 A.2d 886 (1973).
25. See Pyke, Architectural Controls and the Individual Landmark, 36 LAW & CONTEMP.
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the tout ensemble. 6 Each property owner in the district is thus offered
the advantage of predictability and increased property values in ex-
change for the curtailment of the free use of his property. Single land-
mark regulations, construed in relation to precedent established in gen-
eral zoning law, may be attacked as invalid spot zones,2 floating zones28
or takings of property without compensation." The relationship between
a floating zone and spot zoning in the context of landmark preservation
is as follows: under the floating landmark zone, the governing body
makes an advance statement of the specific criteria to be met for desig-
nation and, when the criteria are applied to a specific landmark, the
action can be challenged as spot zoning.30
It has been suggested that the problems of invalidating a single land-
mark designation using the zoning concepts of floating or spot zones can
be avoided if courts are persuaded it is not unreasonable or arbitrary to
distinguish historic properties from their unhistoric neighbors. A dis-
tinction is thus drawn between traditional and historic area zoning.3
PROB. 398 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Pyke], and Note, The Police Power, Eminent
Domain and the Preservation of Historic Property, supra note 19. See generally Historic
Preservation in the American City: A New York Case Study, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
362 (1971).
26. City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 858, 5 So.2d 129, 131 (1941).
27. Spot zoning involves the singling out of a parcel or parcels of land for differential
treatment and is considered by the majority of state courts as an invalid and arbitrary
exercise of the police power, which is sometimes considered a taking of property without
compensation. See HAGMAN, supra note 21, § 93; Pyke, supra note 25, at 399.
28. The floating zone is the creation of a "zone" in an ordinance which floats over the
city until it is affixed to a particular parcel of land. See HAGMAN, supra note 21, § 62; Pyke,
supra note 25.
29. See generally Council on Environmental Quality, The Taking Issue (1973); HAGMAN,
supra note 21, §§ 178-180; Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 650 (1958); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax]; Comment, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensa-
tion for Temporary Taking, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 362 (1968); Note, The Police Power,
Eminent Domain and the Preservation of Historic Property, supra note 19.
30. Pyke, supra note 25, at 400. It would seem that the floating zone would be held
invalid in those jurisdictions where spot zoning is held invalid, but this is not always the
case. For example, in New York the floating zone technique was held valid in Rodgers v.
Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951), while spot zoning was held
invalid in Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
31. Pyke, supra note 25, at 401 states:
that it is not unequal, unreasonable or arbitrary to treat historical properties
differently from their unexceptional neighbors. Since the permitted distinctions
in zoning classification usually rest upon the location of the property and the
[Vol. 25:160
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The Maryland Court of Appeals in City of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel
County" has noted that precise distinction:
[Tiraditional zoning is primarily directed at the use of the land,
[residential, commercial, industrial] as well as the density and the
location of buildings on the land ...[whereas] [hlistoric area zon-
ing . .. is not directed at any of these factors, but only at the
preservation of the exterior of buildings having historic or architectural
merit.
3 3
By extending this distinction to the "taking issue," the court found that
there was no confiscation since there was no deprivation of all reason-
able use of the landmark site and improvement; the "use" was not
affected since only exterior alterations were prohibited.34
The taking of property without just compensation, occurring where a
regulation is found to be unreasonable or not sufficiently public in pur-
pose,3 has proven to be a significant legal hurdle to the use of the police
power for historic preservation. Justice Holmes' statement in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,31 the well-known "balancing test," has
been the test most often used by the courts to distinguish between
"takings" and valid uses of the police power: "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking. '37 Since Pennsylvania Coal, legal commentators and
characteristics of the neighborhood rather than factors intrinsic to the property
itself, courts must be persuaded to accept historical and aesthetic distinctions
[of single buildings] in addition to geographical ones.
32. 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974).
33. Id. at 291, 316 A.2d at 821. This reasoning led the court to hold that the county,
which wanted to demolish the Mt. Moriah Church, a historic landmark, was subject to a
municipal historic district ordinance even though it is exempt from traditional municipal
zoning regulations. Accord, City of Ithaca v. County of Tompkins, 77 Misc. 2d 887, 355
N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (county desiring to demolish a landmark building within a
city).
34. 271 Md. at 294, 316 A.2d at 822.
35. See generally note 25, supra.
36. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
37. Id. at 415. This test "allows a landowner to divide his bundle of sticks into a series
of conceptually separate property rights and then argue that one of these rights was
completely destroyed .. " Council on Environmental Quality, The Taking Issue, supra
note 29, at 244. See also Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search
for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1971) for a clearer articula-
tion of Holmes' test of balancing public gain against private loss. This test, also referred
to as the "diminution of value theory," has been modified by Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962). In Goldblatt an ordinance prohibiting the use of an existing quarry
as a quarry was held to be a valid exercise of the police power and not an unconstitutional
taking merely because it deprived the owner of the most beneficial use of his land. This
has been seen by legal commentators as modifying Pennsylvania Coal without expressly
1975]
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judges have been wrestling with the distinction between "takings" and
valid exercises of the police power. Additional evaluative tests have been
either proposed or adopted to decide such issues." "Nevertheless, the
predominant characteristic of this area of the law is a welter of confusing
and apparently incompatible results. . . . '[N]o rigid rules' or 'set
formula' are available to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins. ""
While the validity of historic preservation as a public purpose has
been generally established," courts have questioned the means em-
ployed to achieve this purpose. Limitations on demolition and change
of exterior, and architectural controls on new construction, although
accomplishing a public end, may sometimes improperly place the bur-
den for achievement on the individual landowner." These same controls
as incident to historic district ordinances, however, have been typically
upheld.2 This approach can be easily justified on the basis of reciprocal
benefits.43 Such justification is not apparent in the case of controls im-
overruling it. See Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 29, at 257-58; Sax, supra
note 29, at 42-43.
38. Some of these tests are: 1) the noxious use theory, which distinguishes whether the
regulation restricts an owner to avoid public harm or to obtain a public benefit, see
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) and
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, supra note 29, at 669; 2) the
enterprise theory, (basically a modification of the above) which distinguishes between a
detriment to a person enhancing the economic value of some governmental enterprise and
the improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict within the private
sector of society, see Sax, supra note 29, at 63; 3) the physical invasion test, which involves
determining whether or not the public or its agents have physically used or occupied
something belonging to the claimant, see Michelman, supra note 29, at 1184; and 4) the
fairness test, which involves determining whether the public welfare is furthered at the
expense of particular individuals, see Michelman, supra note 29, at 1218-24.
39. Sax, supra note 29, at 37.
40. See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
41. See Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of Historic
Property, supra note 19, at 719.
42. See generally note 24, supra. This is true even if the property controlled is not itself
of historic value but is within or adjacent to a historic district. Bohannan v. City of San
Diego, 30 Cal.App.3d 416, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1973); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223
La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129
(1941).
43. Sax, supra note 29, at 73, explains reciprocal benefits stating that even though the
"restriction clearly enhances the resource value of a government enterprise, . . . compen-
sation is properly denied on the ground that the 'victims' received benefits which equal
or exceed the detriment imposed." Usually, these ordinances are upheld because "the
regulation is directed at the protection of property value or the preservation and the
protection of an economically signficant industry-tourism." Note, The Police Power,
Eminent Domain and the Preservation of Historic Property, supra note 19, at 720.
[Vol. 25:160
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posed upon individual historic property not a part of a historic district
because the owner does not receive the benefits of area wide regulation.4
A particularly interesting aspect of historic district and landmark
ordinances which raises additional legal issues is that the controls on
alteration or demolition of historic property can be permanent or tempo-
rary in nature. 5 Certain zoning case precedent suggests that permanent
prohibition as applied to the single landmark is of questionable validity
without a payment of compensation. There is, however, some prece-
dent in zoing law for upholding temporary stays on alteration or demoli-
tion in regard to the single landmark as valid exercises of the police
power. 7
The New York Landmarks Preservation Law adopts the technique
of a temporary stay." Under the law, the Landmarks Commission is
44. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of Historic Prop-
erty, supra note 19, at 722-24.
45. See Comment, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation for Temporary Tak-
ing, supra note 29, and Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation
of Historic Property, supra note 19. Case precedent appears to uphold both permanent
and temporary delays as incident to historic district ordinances. See City of Annapolis v.
Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974) (temporary restriction of up to
one year); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941) (an untimed
or permanent restriction). However, it could very well be that these two cases can be
narrowly construed. The Anne Arundel case could be limited to situations where the
landmark owner is a government body and thus held to a higher burden in pursuit of the
public interest, see note 33, supra. The Pergament and other Louisiana cases cited in note
24, supra, might be unique since the Old French Quarter is protected by the Louisiana
Constitution, article XIV, § 22A (1921). In any event, historic district ordinances are
defensible under the traditional zoning concept of area wide benefits.
46. See Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany Troy Hills,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) and notes 58-60 and accompanying text, infra; Vernon
Park Realty Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) and notes
58-59 and accompanying text, infra. Contra, Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
NW.2d 761 (1972). This decision, however, can be attributed to the particularities of
Wisconsin environmental law. See note 60, infra.
47. Two recent developments in land use control law point up a possible change in the
law: 1) the approval of interim zoning controls by some states, see HAGMAN, supra note
21, § 40 & n. 86, and Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Imple-
menting Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URBAN L. 65 (1971); and 2) the upholding of
timed or phased development by the New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. Planning
Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
Contra, Comment, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation for Temporary Taking,
supra note 29. In comparing landmark ordinances with similar governmental restrictions,
this Comment draws a distinction between the so-called freezing cases and the cases
similar to set-back (distance away from public access way) requirements. The claim is
that though similar factual situations, the freezing cases are takings and the set-back
cases are not.
48. See NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207.8.0 (1965), provides
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authorized to designate historic districts as well as scattered individual
landmark sites.49 Relief from the stay on demolition imposed on the
single landmark varies with the profit status of the landowner." The
for prescribed time periods for the granting of a certificate of appropriateness. The maxi-
mum length of time for these administrative provisions vary substantially between tax-
exempt (380 day maximum) and taxable (220 day maximum) properties. Section 207-5.0
governs the time limits for granting a certificate of no exterior effect and Section 207-9.0
governs the same for the regulation of minor work.
49. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207.2.0 (1965). See
also Wolf, The Landmark Problem of New York, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 99 (1967);
Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, supra note 11.
50. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch, 8-A, § 207.8.0 a (1965) stipulates
the standards which apply to 1) taxable and 2) tax-exempt properties when a demolition
or alteration permit is requested on ground of insufficient return:
(1) . . . the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the commission that:
(a) the improvement parcel (or parcels) which includes such improvement,
• . . is not capable of earning a reasonable return; and
(b) the owner of such improvement:
1) in the case of an application for a permit to demolish, seeks in good
faith to demolish such improvement immediately (a) for the purpose
of constructing on the site thereof with reasonable promptness a new
building or other income-producing facility, or (b) for the purpose of
terminating the operation of the improvement at a loss; or
2) in the case of an application for a permit to make alterations or
reconstruct, seeks in good faith to alter or reconstruct such improve-
ment, with reasonable promptness, for the purpose of increasing the
return therefrom;
(2) . . . the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the commission, .
that:
(a) the owner of such improvement has entered into a bona-fide agreement
to sell an estate of freehold or to grant a term of at least twenty years in such
improvement parcel, which agreement is subject to or contingent upon the
issuance of the certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed;
(b) the improvement parcel which includes such improvement, ... would
not, if it were not exempt. . .from real property taxation, be capable of earning
a reasonable return;
(c) such improvement has ceased to be adequate . . . for carrying out both
(1) the purposes of such owner to which it is devoted and (2) those purposes to
which it had been devoted when acquired unless such owner is no longer engaged
in pursuing such purposes; and
(d) the prospective purchaser or tenant:
(1) in the case of an application for a permit to demolish seeks and
intends, in good faith either to demolish such improvement immedi-
ately for the purpose of constructing on the site thereof with reasona-
ble promptness a new building or other facility; or
(2) in the case of an application for a permit to make alterations or
reconstruct, seeks and intends in good faith to alter or reconstruct
such improvement, with reasonable promptness.
[Vol. 25:160
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profit-oriented owner must show that the landmark site is not capable
of earning a reasonable return;5 ' the charitable owner must show that
the property has ceased to be adequate for his purposes and that he has
entered into an agreement for sale or lease of at least twenty years.5"
THE DECISION
In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York the New York
Court of Appeals, unlike the lower courts, proceeded directly to the
salient issue of the case:
whether that part of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law
which purports to give the Landmarks Preservation Commission the
authority to infringe upon the free use of individual premises remaining
in private ownership is a valid use of the city's police power in cases
where an owner organized for charitable purposes demonstrates hard-
ship, economic or otherwise.3
The court decided the constitutional "taking issue"54 in spite of the fact
that the trial court based its decision solely on the factual issue of
whether or not the Morgan House was a landmark.
The court discusses at some length the "taking" law that applies to
this case, and applies the "taking test" proposed by Sax: when a regula-
tion enhances the value of some governmental enterprise there is a
taking, but when the government regulates to resolve conflicts among
51. Reasonable return is defined as 6% of the current assessed valuation at the time of
filing for a certificate of appropriateness. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch.
8-A. § 207-1.0 g (1965).
52. See generally note 70, infra for a discussion of how the requirements for charitable
organizations were expanded to include the charities which did not want to sell or lease
their property in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App.Div.2d 376, 288
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). See also note 78, infra.
53. 35 N.Y.2d at 123, 316 N.E. 2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
54. The court said that "[slince this is not a case where the constitutional questions
have not before been raised, we see no obstacle to our passing on them for the first time."
Id. at 127, 316 N.E.2d at 309, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 13. The dissenting opinion, on the other
hand, voted to remit the constitutional question to the trial court for further proceedings
on the factual issue of hardship. Id. at 133, 316 N.E.2d at 313, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17. (Jasen,
J., dissenting). The dissent argued that:
before undertaking adjudication of the constitutionality of the Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law. . . we should have the benefit of a full exposition of all factual
issues with express findings made in the courts below. The instant record simply
does not afford us that perspective and as such cannot suffice to render a consti-
tutional determination of such far reaching import to the future of landmarks
preservation in the City of New York, the State and the Nation as well.
Id. at 135, 316 N.E.2d at 314, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 19. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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private parties, compensation is not required.55 In applying the test, the
court concludes that the government in this case acted in its "enterprise
capacity" since the regulation applied to the Morgan House is "neither
in pursuance of a general zoning plan, nor is involved to curtail [a]
noxious use ... "
The court relies on Vernon Park Realty Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon,57
and Morris County Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippanny-Troy
Hills,5" to show how the net effect of a public regulation can be to add
private property to a government's resources without compensation. In
Vernon Park Realty the plaintiff's property was zoned for parking pur-
poses only, thus prohibiting the "use of the property for any purpose
except the parking and storage of automobiles, a service station within
the parking area and the continuance of prior nonconforming uses,"59
and placing the burden of resolving the community's traffic problem on
a single landowner. Parsippanny involved the zoning of a swamp for use
as a wildlife, recreation and agricultural area and for sewage facilities,
which the court said added the property to municipal resources without
the compensation required by the Constitution. 0 In applying both deci-
55. Sax, supra note 29, at 67.
56. 35 N.Y.2d at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14. It is granted that the
regulation does not prohibit a noxious use, but the court does not clarify why it views the
regulation as not pursuant to a general zoning plan and therefore arbitrary. Because the
court relies upon Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.
2d 517 (1954), a spot zoning case, it could well be that the court is supporting its conclusion
that the regulation is not pursuant to a general zoning plan by analogizing the landmark
designation to spot zoning. See Wolf, The Landmark Problem in New York, supra note
49, at 105-07 which suggests that the New York City Landmarks Commission would have
difficulty in meeting the test of arbitrariness because the ordinance does not clearly
specify which structures are likely to be designated. However, as with any legislative or
quasi-legislative body, the process and documentation of each individual designation
should suffice as a declaration of purpose to be then tested for arbitrariness.
57. 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
58. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
59. 307 N.Y. at 498, 121 N.E.2d at 519. There are two levels of analysis in this case.
First, the ordinance was declared void as arbitrary and invalid spot zoning. Contra, Ray
Realty Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 328 Mass. 103, 101 N.E.2d 888 (1951) (a more
restricted apartment zone) and Taylor v. Schlemmer, 353 Mo. 687, 183 S.W.2d 913 (1944)
(extension of a lower density residential district to a block previously in an apartment
district). Accord, Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Sommerville, 331 Mass. 547, 120 N.E.2d
753 (1954) (a three-acre residential island in forty-two-acres zoned industrial, where the
character of the area was industrial). Second, the ordinance was declared an unconstitu-
tional taking as applied.
60. 40 N.J. at 555, 193 A.2d at 241. But see Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the validity of a county
shoreland ordinance because public rights to eradicate and prevent pollution of the natu-
ral state can be protected by means of the police power even if it means private lands are
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sions to the instant case the court concluded that for practical purposes
the commission had added the House to the resources of the city by
depriving the plaintiff of the reasonable use of its land. The Sax test of
enrichment of a government enterprise at the expense of a private
landowner was met.
The New York Court of Appeals considered the validity of the Morgan
House designation in view of the historical prohibition against unreason-
able limitations on the "use" of property stating that "a zoning ordi-
nance in order to be validly applied cannot . . . serve to prohibit the
use to which the property is devoted at the time of the enactment of the
ordinance."'" The court relies on the Forster v. Scott" definition of what
constitutes an unreasonable infringement on the use of property:
What the legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly ...
It is not necessary, in order to render a statute obnoxious to the re-
straints of the Constitution, that it must in terms or in effect authorize
an actual physical taking of the property or the thing itself, so long as
it affects its free use and enjoyment, or the power of disposition at the
will of the owner. 3
The court concludes that the landmark designation in the instant case
prohibits the "use" to which the property has been put for over twenty
years because of the plaintiff's inability under the designation to replace
the building, a necessary prerequisite to continue its functioning. In
arriving at this conclusion, the court does not distinguish between direct
restrictions on the use of land as in traditional zoning ordinances and
the "indirect" restrictions on use imposed by landmark and historic
restricted to their natural uses. "The changing of wetlands and swamps to the damage of
the general public by upsetting the natural environment and the natural relationship is
not a reasonable use of that land .... Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. The "natural state"
theory proposed in Marinette County, though a hallmark in environmental law, is difficult
to extend to landmark preservation law. In order to impose such a high burden on an
individual property owner's right to use his property, the public purpose must be one of
extreme necessity, e.g., the prevention of pollution.
61. 35 N.Y. at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14. Basically, a change in use
would be classified as a nonconforming use with specific provisions for amortization,
allowance of alterations, expansions, etc. HAGMAN, supra note 21, §§ 80-89.
62. 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
63. Id. at 584, 32 N.E. at 977. Accord, Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82
A.2d 34 (1951). In the Forster case, the property owner was deprived of the right to build
upon his property. The deprivation was caused by a statute providing that after a map of
a proposed street has been filed, no compensation can be made to the owner for any
improvements put upon the land during the time between the filing of the map and the
condemnation proceeding.
64. 35 N.Y.2d at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
19751
DEPAUL LA W REVIEW
district ordinances as was done in City of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel
County."
The court also does not distinguish between the absolute limitations
in the Vernon Park Realty, the Parsippanny and the Forster cases, and
the temporary stay under the Landmark Preservation Law. The defen-
dant in Keystone Associates v. Moerdler," an earlier case, attempted to
draw such a distinction by suggesting that there was a taking in the
Forster case because the ordinance was indefinite in duration. 7 The
court, however, said this contention was irrelevant since "where the
restriction itself cannot be justified, the period of time during which it
operates is of no relevance"6 other than to clarify the degree of damage
or loss. Using the Forster and Keystone cases, the court seems to be
saying that even an "indirect" restriction on use is constitutionally pro-
hibited, and a definite time duration for a temporary restriction is irrele-
vant if the use of the property is impaired at all.
The majority states that the similarity between Keystone, Forster
and the instant case is that in all of them title remained in the record
owner" during the period that the use of the property was severely
impaired. The court distinguishes these former cases, however, by not-
ing that they held the statute itself unconstitutional; whereas in the
instant case the Landmark Law is not per se unconstitutional, although
it may be unconstitutional as applied in certain factual situations.
Finally, the court articulates the confiscation test that is to be ap-
plied in the case of a charitable organization not seeking to sell or lease
its property: Whether landmark designation would prevent or seriously
interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose.1 The New York
Court of Appeals, while using this test developed in Trustees of Sailors'
Snug Harbor v. Platt,7°0 ' does not totally follow that case's precedent.
65. 271 Md. at 294, 316 A.2d at 822. See discussion in text accompanying notes 31-34,
supra. This distinction could be important in terms of degrees of proof: to prove an
indirect restriction on use would appear to require a higher burden of proof on the part of
the property owner in view of the presumption of validity accorded to zoning ordinances.
66. 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
67. Id. at 88, 224 N.E.2d at 703, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
68. Id.
69. 35 N.Y.2d at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
70. The test was developed in Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 933,
280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1967); rev'd on other grounds, 29 App.Div.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d
314 (1968). The appellate division reversed a lower court ruling that there was a taking
on the grounds that there were not sufficient facts on which to render a determination as
to whether the preservation of the buildings would seriously interfere with the use of the
property, whether the buildings were capable of conversion to a useful purpose without
excessive cost, or whether costs of maintaining them would entail serious expenditure.
70.1. 53 Misc. 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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Trustees was remanded for further fact finding on the issue of hardship.
Whereas in Lutheran Church the court found that the test was met since
the allegation of economic hardship of the plaintiff "stands substan-
tially unrebutted by the defendants" and "it is uncontested that the
existing building is totally inadequate for plaintiff's legitimate needs
and must be replaced if plaintiff is to be able freely and economically
'7Mto use the premises ... .
There are two alternate theories for the holding in this case. One
theory is that, although the public purpose of the ordinance is not chal-
lenged, perhaps the court was influenced by the apparently insufficient
historic value of the Morgan House. 7" The fact that the artistic and
historic value of the property was in dispute could have had a great
impact in the court's application of the balancing test of public benefit
versus private loss. Perhaps, the court is indirectly saying that preserva-
tion of buildings of questionable historic or architectural value is not a
public purpose under the police power.
A second theory of the holding is based on the reasonableness of the
regulation. The court highlights twice in the opinion 3 the fact that the
ameliorative provisions of the Law that apply to taxable property do not
apply to charitable owners:74 "[p]laintiff is a charitable organization
and not otherwise subject to the various administrative alternatives set
up in section 207-8.0 which could result in condemnation of the property
71. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17. The dissent argued for
remanding to the trial court for further fact-finding. Id. at 133, 316 N.E.2d at 313, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 18. (Jasen, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent raises the defense alleged
in defendant's brief that the property is not zoned for a nineteen-story office building. Id.
at 133 n. 2, 316 N.E.2d at 313 n. 2, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n. 2. (Jasen, J., dissenting). The
dissent claimed the controversy is thus rendered academic until such a time as the zoning
is appropriately varied. This allegation was summarily dismissed by the majority opinion
as irrelevant to the constitutional issue before them. Id. at 126, 316 N.E.2d at 309, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 12. The majority's conclusion was well-reasoned since at issue before the court
was whether a restraint on demolition constitutes a taking. Whether or not existing zoning
permits the Lutheran Church to build their proposed building was not a factor in deter-
mining the constitutionality of the Landmarks Law as applied.
72. The court at one point said: "None of the defendants' witnesses, however, testified
that this house was an architectural masterpiece, nor was there any evidence that any
significant historical event ever took place therein." 35 N.Y.2d at 127, 316 N.E.2d at 309,
359 N.Y.S.2d at 12. Also, the court interjected at one point that the finding of hardship
and legitimate need was somehow especially supported by the fact that "adjoining struc-
tures have been integrated with plaintiff's operations." Id. at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 17. This latter fact would seem to negate the value of the Morgan House as a
"free-standing brownstone."
73. Id. at 124, 131, 132, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10, 16.
74. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 a (1965). See also
note 50, supra.
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sought to be altered or demolished."75
Section 207-8.0 i of the Landmarks Law provides that, upon a deter-
mination by the Landmarks Commission that the four requirements
for a charitable organization are met,7" the commission should find a
purchaser or tenant of the improvement parcel or parcels within one
hundred and eighty days of the initial determination. If this endeavor
is not successful within the stipulated period, the commission then may,
within twenty days after the expiration of the one hundred eighty day
period, recommend to the mayor that the city acquire a protective inter-
est in the structure. If within ninety days after transmission of this
recommendation, the city does not give notice to condemn, the commis-
sion will issue a notice to proceed.7 7 The court seems to construe these
provisions as only applicable to charities seeking to sell or lease their
properties. However, in the same way that the court adopted the
Trustees' test for charities not wanting to sell or lease their properties,
it could have applied these provisions in Lutheran Church.7 1
Even if the court had construed that the charitable provisions of
section 207-8.0 applied, in all likelihood the court would still have found
an invalid "taking" by applying the principles articulated in the
75. 35 N.Y.2d at 131-32, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The dissent stated the
same conclusion, limiting it to the absence of any express ameliorative provisions for
charitable owners who do not wish to sell or lease their property and not charitable owners
in general. 35 N.Y.2d at 135, 316 N.E.2d at 314, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 19. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
However, the dissenting opinion suggested that all possible remedies had not been ex-
hausted since "there has been no exposition whatever of plaintiff's option to transfer the
air rights, the theoretical surplus of unused floor area, from the landmark site to plaintiff's
adjacent five story administrative office annex." 35 N.Y.2d at 122 n. 2, 316 N.E.2d at 313
n. 2, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n. 2 (Jasen, J., dissenting). See note 91, infra for a discussion of
New York's transfer of development rights provisions.
76. See note 50, supra, for an exposition of the four requirements for charities. See also
notes 11, 70, supra.
77. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 i (1965).
78. Id. These provisions, however, are of a different nature than those provided for
taxable property such as total or partial tax exemption, remission of taxes and authoriza-
tion for alterations, construction or reconstruction appropriate to the Landmark Law. The
main remedy provided for non-tax-exempt properties in order to guarantee a reasonable
return is the remission of taxes. Id. § 207-8.0 c. The more stringent requirements for
charitable organizations have been criticized by some legal commentators as questionable
provisions. Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New York City Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 306 (1971) and Comment, Legal Methods of
Historic Preservation, supra note 11. On the other hand, it could be argued that a more
stringent standard should apply to charities since they are already the recipients of sub-
stantial benefits resulting from their tax-exempt status. The development of additional
remedies for charitable organizations amounts to a "windfall" because they already pos-
sess the main remedy allowed for taxable properties."
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Keystone case.79 The fact that condemnation at the end of the tempo-
rary stay period is "optional""0 with the commission as well as the New
York City Council, and that the law contains no explicit provisions for
delay damages or other express relief, would provide a basis for the court
of appeals' "taking" conclusion. It is apparent that where there is a
"freezing" of the incidents of ownership (in this case demolition) with-
out any administrative relief or adequate compensation, the action will
be construed a "taking."
Previous New York case law appears to uphold this view of a freezing
action." However, in Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,2
the New York Court of Appeals said, "the fact that [an] ordinance
limits the use of, and may depreciate the value of the property will not
render it unconstitutional . . . unless it can be shown that the measure
is either unreasonable in terms of necessity or the diminution in value
is such as to be tantamount to a confiscation.""3 Though the court of
appeals could have found that in terms of the rapidity with which urban
landmarks are disappearing there is a great public necessity to stop the
trend, and that a temporary stay on demolition to seek other solutions
is not an unreasonable means of attaining the objective, it decided to
follow the precedent of Keystone 4 to find a taking.
79. Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1966). This case, declaring a statute relating to the disposition of the old opera house void
as unconstitutional, has three main points: 1) compensation for taking must be sure and
certain; 2) the legislature cannot set a maximum figure on the amount of compensation
that will be paid; and 3) if a restriction itself cannot be justified, the period of time during
which it operates is of no relevance.
80. See NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 i (1965) and
discussion in text accompanying notes 76-77, supra.
81. Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1966).
82. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). In this case, a series of
requirements had to be met in order to uphold the validity of a timed growth ordinance.
First, the purpose of the ordinance was one of public necessity i.e., orderly community
growth with adequate public facilities. Second, the restricted property owners received a
benefit from the restriction. The hardship of holding nonproductive property for some
time might be compensated for by the ultimate benefit reverting to the owner as a result
of substantial increase in value. The restriction could be for as long as 18 years in accord-
ance with the long-range capital improvements program. Third, there was a guarantee
that the temporary restrictions would be lifted at the specified time. (The Town of Ra-
mapo committed itself to a program of development while placing restrictions on land
use.) Fourth, there was an ameliorative provision in the ordinance allowing the property
owner to develop his land if he provided the public facilities.
83. Id. at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
84. 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
Urban landmarks are increasingly threatened with extinction because
of the pressures of the marketplace for the "highest and best use" of the
land. Landmark ordinances restricting the right of individual landmark
owners to demolish or alter the landmark structure impose a dual bur-
den on the property owners: higher maintenance costs to preserve the
landmark and reduced property values. Even temporary restrictions on
demolition, while alternative plans for preservation are developed, may
result in delay damages and decreased property values. Furthermore,
due to the large amount of public funds required, and the problems
attendant to removal of properties from the marketplace, the govern-
ment purchase of fee interests for urban landmarks is impracticable.
The case of Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, even
though narrowly decided on its facts, sets an important precedent for
single landmark preservation. A temporary restriction on a charitable
organization's landmark property, designated as such under a landmark
ordinance which has no express ameliorative provisions for charities not
wanting to sell or lose their property, will be considered a "taking" if
the existing structure is totally inadequate for the charitable purpose.
Though the case did not invalidate any provision of the Landmarks Law
and, in fact did not even test any of the express provisions of the Act,
another New York case, Keystone Associates v. Moerdler suggests that
even the express ameliorative provisions for taxable property"6 and for
tax-exempt property where the owner wishes to sell or lease might still
amount to a taking."
In order to avoid the pervasiveness of the taking issue, landmark
ordinances should incorporate certain explicit provisions in order for the
courts to view single landmark preservation more favorably. The two
New York cases, Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo"5 and
Keystone Associates v. Moerdler,9 offer some criteria that could be
85. 19 N.Y.2d 89, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966). See note 79, supra.
86. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 c (1965). See
also Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 89, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966),
note 79, supra, which mentions that the legislature cannot set a maximum figure on the
amount of compensation that will be paid. This could mean that the setting of a fixed
6% return for taxable properties will also be invalid. See Wolf, The Landmark Problem
in New York, supra note 49, at 107-08, which explains that the 6% of assessed valuation
established as a reasonable return for landmarks in the N.Y. Landmarks Preservation Law
is based on the amount allowed under the Rent Control Laws. The position is that what
may be reasonable for emergency rent control may not be reasonable for landmarks.
87. See discussion in text accompanying notes 73-80, supra.
88. See note 82, supra.
89. See note 79, supra.
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applied to New York City's Landmarks Law as well as to similar ordi-
nances in other states. First, courts and legislatures must be persuaded
to expand the concept of "public necessity" to include the predicament
of the urban landmark. In this way the weight of the public purpose for
application of the constitutional balancing test between public benefit
and private loss would be increased. This can be done both by legislative
findings of fact in adoption of landmark ordinances and by evidence
introduced in the courtroom. Second, there must be some benefit or
remedy accruing to the landmark owner as a result of the restriction.
This would amount to the provision of explicit remedies in the ordinance
to cure any delay damages as well as property value loss. Keystone
refines the requirements for ameliorating loss; compensation for a "tak-
ing" must be sure and certain. 0 The New York City Landmarks Law
makes condemnation optional both for the Landmark Commission to
recommend such to the City Council and for the council to take action.
Thus a landmark owner's property rights of demolition and alteration
are delayed for a specified time period and, if no plan for preservation
is accepted and the city does not condemn, the landowner is left remedi-
less even if he incurred a loss for the delay. Alternate remedies must be
provided for negotiation during the period of delay and, hopefully, even
before a landmark owner asks for a demolition or alteration permit. The
New York City Landmarks Law provides for the remission of taxes in
the case of taxable properties, but other remedies are possible such as
the creation of a transfer development rights bank,9 the creation of a
90. 19 N.Y.2d at 89, 224 N.E.2d at 703, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
91. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADFur: LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE 56-57
and 105-06 (1974). See also Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the
Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); and Note, Development
Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972). The transfer of development
rights provisions under New York City's Zoning Ordinance were established to supple-
ment the relief provisions of the Landmark Preservation Law. Note, Development Rights
Transfer in New York City, supra, at 351, mentions two "resolutions;" the 1961 § 74-79
resolution, which allows transfer of potential development rights to a contiguous parcel
provided that both areas were under the same ownership; and a 1968 amendment, which
expands the definition of "contiguous" to include land across the street and permits
transfers between separately owned properties. In order to effectuate such a transfer
certain conditions must be met: there must be a willing buyer of the rights, the property
owner must be willing to sell (unless the municipality wants to condemn the rights), the
property must have an excess or unused portion of development rights, and the transfer
of the rights to contiguous property however defined should not unduly increase the
density or destroy the historical or architectural character of the landmark structure. The
facts of Lutheran Church mandate compliance with the last three requirements. First, the
property owner must be willing to accept the plan to transfer its rights to the adjacent 5-
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revolving fund for building maintenance subsidies in order for landmark
owners to maintain a reasonable return, acquisition by the city of a
scenic easement over the exterior of the structure,"2 and the creation of
a landmarks not-for-profit corporation to buy, by negotiation or
condemnation, and lease landmark properties back into the market-
place. 3
If these alternatives are not feasible, the landmark owner must still
be guaranteed compensation. This could be done by the municipality
guaranteeing, if none of the plans are accepted by the end of the delay
period, that it will either condemn the property and pay the assessed
value prior to designation or that the landmark owner will be allowed
to alter or demolish but be paid any actual delay damages. If some or
all of these ameliorative provisions are not included in a landmarks
ordinance, dependence must be placed solely on the courts to find tem-
porary stays on demolition without compensation constitutional. The
stance of the New York Court of Appeals in Lutheran Church, as clari-
fied using the criteria identified in the Keystone and Ramapo cases, and
the precedent value a New York case will have on landmark preserva-
tion law in general, makes the prospects of such a finding questionable.
Landmark preservation is a costly proposition and the basic issue is
whether the public will be willing to bear the cost.
Nilda Soler
story building. Second, the Morgan House landmark site must have unused rights to
transfer. Since the site is not zoned to permit a 19-story office building the question is
raised as to whether there were any such unused rights. However, the city could negotiate
to amend or change the zoning to allow for such a transfer. Would this again be spot
zoning? Third, there is the problem of the architectural character of the Morgan House
being diminished by an adjacent 19-story office building. In spite of these problems, the
possibility of using transfer development rights as an ameliorative device was lost in this
case because of the majority's insistance that there was sufficient proof introduced at the
trial court level to decide the constitutional issue.
92. Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, supra note 11, at 621.
93. For other possible approaches, see id. at 616-24.
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